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could lead to some undesirable results7 1 Therefore, the special
character of the industry should be considered before resorting
to any unduly strict interpretation of them.
Robert J. Prejeant
THE "$30 OR 30 DAYS" FINE AS APPLIED TO INDIGENTS
The practice of imprisoning convicted defendants for failure
to pay fines was firmly imbedded in the common law1 and is
established by statute in most states.2 Imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine was seldom questioned in federal courts, and,
until the 1960's, none of the challenges to this procedure appears
to have been founded upon a defendant's indigency.3 Even as
late as 1968, a federal district court upheld on constitutional
grounds the practice of imprisonment of indigents under the
alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment.4 Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit's recent pronouncement that the alternative sen71. For example, if article 779 were strictly applied, it would mean the
landowner could select the location upon which the mineral servitude should
be exercised, because the manner of exercising the servitude would be
uncertain. The mineral servitude owner or those who derive their rights
therefrom will always be in a better position to know the best place to
locate a well, not the landowner.
1. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 311 (8th ed. 1970): "But it
was in the reign of Edward I in the latter half of the thirteenth century
that incarceration came into extensive use In England, though even in this
period it was used primarily as a 'squeezer,' or means of securing fines."
See also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGIUSH LAW 43-50 (3d ed. 1927);
1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57 (1883); STURGE,
STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 32-33 (9th ed. 1950).
2. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.010, .030 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-10-10 (1963); HAWAI REv. STAT. §§ 712-14 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-2227a (Supp. 1972); NEv. Rzv. STAT. § 176.065 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 7221-23 (Supp. 1972).
3. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 113 n.10, 473 P.2d 999, 1007 n.10, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 255, 263 n.10 (1970): "Prior to 1960 none of the cases appear to have
involved challenges based upon a defendant's indigency. [Citations omitted.]
The question whether the imprisonment of indigent convicted defendants
for non-payment of fines offended the equal protection clause under the
principle declared in Griffin was raised in Wildeblood v. United States,
supra, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 163, 284 F.2d 592 (dissent by Edgerton, J.). During
the last ten years numerous cases dealt with the question." [Citations
omitted.]
See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 926 (1970), and 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 388 at 727-28 (1964).
4. Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732, 736 (D. Mich. 1968): "It has
been generally held that commitment under such circumstances is not an
unconstitutional imprisonment for debt, and that it does not violate any
other constitutional provision, although doubt has been expressed where it
results in a total imprisonment longer than the maximum imprisonment
which could have been imposed for the offense." (Emphasis added.)
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tence is unconstitutional as applied to indigents 5 marks a significant reversal of the law. This Comment will analyze the reasoning and policy considerations which induced this rapid development, and evaluate the consequences of the invalidation of
the alternative sentence as applied to indigents in the Fifth Circuit. The particular effect upon Louisiana's system of fines will
also be considered.
The Fifth Circuit recently confronted these issues in the
decision of Frazierv. Jordan." In that case, the petitioner pleaded
not guilty to a violation of two local ordinances Subsequently,
he was found guilty on both counts and received an alternative
sentence of a $17 fine or thirteen days in jail for each violation.
Petitioner, an indigent, was unable to pay the fine and was consequently compelled to commence serving his two consecutive
thirteen day terms. While serving his second term, he was
granted a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that imprisonment of an indigent under the traditional alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment is a denial of equal protion under the fourteenth amendment. 8
Due to the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the equal protection
clause, it is necessary to understand the recent adoption of more
stringent standards in this area by the Supreme Court." Until
the latter half of the 1960's the Supreme Court used a solitary
standard of equal protection, 0 under which it was necessary
only that the statutory distinction at issue bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end:
"State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
5. Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1972).
6. Id.
7. ATLANTA, GA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 12-2, 20-30 (Atlanta Noise & Fire
Ordinances).
8. The United States Supreme Court has not yet deliberated on the
precise issue which squarely confronted the Fifth Circuit in the Frazier
decision. It does not appear that Jordan, the superintendent of the City of
Atlanta Prison Farm, applied for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
9. For an exhaustive treatment of the growing application of the equal
protection clause, see The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services & Wealth, 7 HARY. Crv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 105 (1972), and
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
10. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294
U.S. 580 (1935); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911);
.Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
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constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it."1
However, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 12 indication
of another standard of equal protection appeared.'8 There, the
Court laid the foundation for the more rigorous standards of the
compelling state interest test.14 This new standard has been
applied by the Supreme Court in two general areas: 1) when
there is a fundamental right in question,' 5 and 2) when the
state's discrimination is based on a "suspect" criterion.1 6 In the
absence of either, the Supreme Court will continue to apply the
traditional equal protection test.'
While the court in Frazier primarily supported its ruling
with a vigorous application of the compelling state interest test,
it first had to deal with three United States Supreme Court
caseg. A consideration of these cases will reveal a gradual expan11. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1961). See also McDonald
v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969), for a similar illustration of this standard.
12. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
13. Id. at 666: "We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of
the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard .... Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate."
14. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968), states some of the underlying considerations which are evaluated by the Court in Its application of
the compelling state interest test: "In determining whether or not a state
law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and
circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." The Court therefore held that "the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a whole . . . [are] an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 34.
15. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969): "But, of course, the
traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification
here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest."
16. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969):
"And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines
are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, supra, two factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting Judicial scrutiny.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); McLauglin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964)."
17. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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sion of the rights of indigents in the criminal fining process, and
will also illustrate that the holding in Frazier represents a
definite extension of these cases.
The inequalities in the area of fining and indigency were
8 where the appellant
initially questioned in Williams v. Illinois,"
was convicted for petty theft and received the maximum sentence of one year imprisonment and a $500 fine plus $5 in court
costs. Under Illinois law, if the appellant had not paid his fine
at the end of his term, he was forced to remain in jail to "work
off" his monetary obligation at the rate of $5 per day.19 The
Supreme Court held this was impermissible discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause when the aggregate imprisonment of an indigent prisoner exceeded the statutory maximum as a result of his financial inability to pay.20 The Court did
not indicate whether it was applying the traditional equal protection formula or the compelling state interest test.2 1
Williams was specifically limited to the prohibition of incarcerating an indigent beyond the statutory maximum. 22 As long

as imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum, the
fact that an indigent may be imprisoned for a longer time than
a non-indigent is not a violation of the equal protection clause.2
The Court specifically stated that its decision did not deal with
24
the traditional alternative sentence of "30 dollars or 30 days.
18. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
19. Hence, the appellant was incarcerated for 101 days over the statutory
maximum.

20. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970): "We conclude that
when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the maximum period fixed by the
statute and results directly from an involuntary nonpayment of a fine or
court costs we are confronted with an impermissible discrimination that
rests on ability to pay, and accordingly, we vacate the judgment below."
(Emphasis added.)
21. See Note, 48 N. DAK. L. REV. 109 (1971), and Note, 16 VILL. L. REv.
754 (1971).
22. 399 U.S. at 243: "We hold only that a State may not constitutionally
Imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is
financially unable to pay a fine." See also 399 U.S. at 240-42. For further
discussion, see text accompanying note 31 infra.
23. 399 U.S. at 243: "The mere fact that an indigent In a particular
case may be imprisoned for a longer time than a non-indigent convicted
of the same offense does not, of course, give rise to a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause." See also Note, 22 SYRACUSy L. REV. 807 (1971).
24. 399 U.S. at 243: "It bears emphasis that our holding does not deal
with a judgment of confinement for nonpayment of a fine in the familiar
pattern of alternative sentence of '$30 or 30 days.'" Justice Harlan, concurring on due process grounds rather than accepting the equal protection
rationale of the majority, likewise stated that there was no Intention to

1973]

COMMENTS

On the same day it decided Williams, the Court remanded
the similar case of Morris v. Schoonfield25 for reconsideration
in light of Williams. In addition to the per curiam order, there
was a short concurring opinion by four justices 2 which issued
a warning as to future sentencing in this area. Referring to
the factual situation in Williams and Morris, Justice White
wrote:
"In each case, the Constitution prohibits the State from
imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full."
This language at least indicated that the Supreme Court would
not hesitate to consider similar questions involving the imprison-,
28
ment of indigents.
This caution was applied the following year by the final
case in the trilogy, Tate v. Short.29 Tate, an indigent, was convicted on nine traffic offense charges and fined a total of $425.
Unable to pay, he was sent to a municipal prison farm to work
off his fine at the rate of $5 per day.8 0 The Court found the same
unconstitutional discrimination here as in Williams, and adopted
the view expressed by the four concurring justices in Morris.
Tate v. Short is a logical application of Williams. The
statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for these violations
was zero days because the statutes imposed no imprisonment
at all for these offenses. Since petitioner was required to serve
85 days in jail, this was imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum. Like Williams, this is an unconstitutional discrimination
because the petitioner was imprisoned beyond the statutory
maximum solely because of his indigency.2 1
cast any doubt on the validity of the conventional "$30 or 30 days" sentence.
Id. at 265. See also Note, 22 SYRACUSE L. RE V. 807 (1971) and Note, 16 VILL. L.
REv. 754 (1971).
25. 399 U.S. 508 (1970).

26. Id. at 509. Joining in the concurring opinion were Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall.
27. Id.

28. Id. "But Williams means, at minimum, that in imposing fines as
punishment for criminal conduct more care must be taken to provide for
those whose lack of funds would otherwise automatically convert a

fine

into a jail sentence."
29. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
30. TEX. CODE CaIM. PRoc. art. 45.53 (1966).
31. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 -98 (1971): "Although the instant case

involves offenses punishable by fines only, petitioner's imprisonment for
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One of the primary economic benefits of traffic offense
statutes is augmentation of the state's revenues through the
collection of fines. The state's penal objectives are served by
the deterrent effect of forcing payment of these fines and not
through imprisonment.32 This is not the case with the alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment.38 In such a situation, the
legislature has made it clear that its penal objectives will be
satisfied either by the payment of the fine or by imprisonment.
Hence, an indigent sentenced to a seventeen dollar fine or thirteen days in jail would not be subjected to imprisonment beyond
the statutory maximum, since the statutory maximum is thirteen
days.
This narrow interpretation of Williams and Tate indicates
that Frazier has extended the reasoning of these cases beyond
their specific factual situations. It is on this point that the Fifth
4
Circuit's reasoning diverged from the other courts of appeals.
In two other instances a federal circuit court had been confronted with the constitutional problem of the alternative sentence as applied to indigents, but in each case the court avoided
the constitutional issue."5 Hence, the invalidation of the alternonpayment constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination
since, like Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely because
of his Indigency." (Footnote omitted.)
32. Id. at 399: "Imprisonment in such a case is not imposed to further
any penal objective of the State." (Emphasis added.) It should be noted
that the italicized words refer to Imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum and not to incarceration under the alternative sentence.
33. For contradicting interpretations of Tate and its impact on the
"$30 or 30 days" fine see Note, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 159 (1971), and Note, 24
U. FLA. L. REv. 166 (1971).
34. The federal circuits have followed Williams, Morris and Tate, but
have refrained from giving these cases the expansive interpretation utilized
in Frazier.See, e.g., U.S. v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971); U.S. v.
Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971); Baldwin v. Smith, 446 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir.
1971); U.S. v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1971).
Earlier cases before the Fifth Circuit have not gone as far as Frazier.
Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) (the inability of an indigent
defendant to make bond should not extend the duration of his imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum); Wade v. Carsley, 433 F.2d 68 (5th
Cir. 1970) (the additional incarceration of 166 and 2/ days for inability to
pay the fine was held to be patently unconstitutional under Williams).
35. In Cavanaugh v. District of Columbia, 441 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
the appellant was sentenced to $25 or 5 days in jail for disorderly conduct.
The court held the appellant was not indigent at the time the fine was
imposed nor did he raise any Issue In court as to his inability to pay the
fine. In Harris v. U.S., 440 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the appellant was
sentenced to 30 days in jail and a fine of $500 or 90 days in jail. However,
the appellant had not made the trial judge aware that he was an indigent.
The court stated the appellant should have filed a motion to vacate or
modify the judgment of fine or imprisonment In lieu of paying the fine.
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native sentence in Frazier is the most far reaching extension of
the Williams and Tate decisions by a federal court.
This issue had been previously considered by a state court.
In In re Antazo,36 a decision of the California supreme court,
the defendant was faced with "a fine in the amount of $2,500
plus a penalty assessment in the amount of $625, or, in lieu of
payment thereof to be imprisoned in the county jail one day
for each $10 of the unpaid amount."3 The court determined that
the practice of imprisoning indigents under the alternative sentence is not necessary to promote a compelling state interest.3
Antazo stated that an indigent who would pay his fine if he
could must be given an option similar to the offender who is
not indigent.8 9 The court in Frazier followed this reasoning of
Antazo, likewise basing its decision on the compelling state
interest test.
Wealth as a "Suspect" Classification
In Frazier, the court stated that the alternative sentence
is a legislative pronouncement that the state's penal interests
will be served only by the immediate payment of a fine or by
imprisonment. 40 Hence, this is distinguishable from a conviction
where the state's only penal interest is a fine, as in Tate. The
imposition of this alternative sentence creates two separately
treated classes of offenders: first, those who can pay the fine
immediately and thereby avoid imprisonment; and second, those
who are indigent, with no alternative to incarceration. 41 The
court then concluded that, "[s]ince the difference in treatment
36. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
37. Id. at 104, 473 P.2d at 1000, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
38. Id. at 115, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265: "We therefore
conclude that petitioner's imprisonment because of his inability, due
solely to his Indigency, to pay the fine and penalty assessment imposed
upon him as a condition of probation was not necessary to promote the
state interests claimed by respondent and constituted an invidious discrimination based on his poverty in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
39. Id. at 116, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265. For a thorough
examination of Antazo, see Note, 16 ViLL. L. Rv. 754 (1971).
40. 457 F.2d at 728.
41. Id. See also In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 108, 473 P.2d 999, 1003, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 255, 259 (1970): "To put it in another way and in the context of the
present case, when a fine in the same amount is imposed upon co-defendants
deemed equally culpable with the added provision for their imprisonment
In the event of its nonpayment, an option is given to the rich defendant
but denied to the poor one."
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is one defined by wealth, the alternative fine creates a 'suspect'
classification which must be tested by the compelling state
'42
interest test.
The Fifth Circuit understood that the default imprisonment
of indigents under this conventional alternative sentence allegedly advances two broad interests of the state: the state's
monetary interest in the collection of fines, and its interest in
rehabilitation of the offender who refuses or is unable to pay
the fine. 48 The first interest is not valid because the indigent is not
coerced or encouraged to pay the fine for fear of the alternative
imprisonment since he has no money in the first place. Consequently, he has no real "alternative" under the alternative sentence. It is apparent that the state's financial interests in this particular area are diminished rather than enhanced by the economic
burden of supporting these imprisoned indigents.4 4 Thus, the
state's first interest does not satisfy the more rigid and exacting
requirement of the Supreme Court's compelling state interest
45
test.
The state is not actually interested in rehabilitation, the
second broad interest in this area. This is so because the state
has decreed that its punitive and deterrent interests can be
adequately served through the payment of the fine.A Those
who can pay the fine are not subjected to any rehabilitation
program. The indigent is actually being imprisoned for his
failure to pay the fine rather than as punishment for his violation of the statute. Thus, rehabilitation plays no viable role in
incarceration of an indigent under the alternative sentence.4 7
The Fifth Circuit felt that there are other means of collection
which are more equitable:
"We hold that the penal and deterrent effect of the immediate fine may be achieved through the alternative device
42. Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1972). See also In re
Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 111, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261 (1970):
"Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden

of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the
law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its
purpose." (Citations omitted.)
43. 457 F.2d at 728-29.

44.
45.
46.
47.

See text at note 56 infra.
Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 729.
See text at note 60 infra.
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of installment payments appropriately calculated, and perhaps through other measures which the states, in their
48
wisdom, may devise.
As neither of the state's interests satisfied the compelling state
interest test,49 "the detention imposed according to the alternative sentence was unlawful."50
The Future of the Alternative Sentence
The presentation by the Fifth Circuit and the California
supreme court of the equal protection argument on the basis of
wealth as a suspect criterion will be difficult to refute. 51 Further,
two Justices of the Supreme Court have recently indicated, by
way of a concurring opinion, that the alternative sentence as
52
applied to indigents is subject to critical analysis.
In addition to this equal protection argument, the Frazier
decision is supported by persuasive policy considerations. First,
the courts have lost sight of the original purpose of the alternative sentence. These statutes were primarily designed to punish
the unyielding defendant who refused to pay.5 3 Second, the
increased use of fines as a criminal sanction has made non-payment one of the fundamental causes of imprisonment in the
United States. 54 One authority estimates that forty to sixty per
cent of all prisoners incarcerated in county jails are there be48. Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. Id. at 728-29 (5th Cir. 1972). Under the traditional test of the equal
protection clause, the state could probably uphold its interest in this area.
Such an alternative sentence induces an offender to pay immediately or
somehow secure the required money rather than go to jail. See text at notes
10 & 11 supra.
50. 457 F.2d at 730.
51. See generally Comment, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778 (1969).
52. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
53. Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732, 736 (D. Md. 1968): "Committing the defendant to jail is no part of the punishment; the penalty or
the punishment adjudged is the fine, and the custody adjudged Is the mode
of executing the sentence." See also Note, 60 Ky. L.J. 225, 233 (1971); Note,
45 TUL. L. REV. 627, 628 (1971); Comment, 101 U. PA. L. Rv. 1013, 1021 (1953).
54. S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDWARDS, & S. ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION § 16, at 252-53 (1963): "A generation ago, the National
Commission on Law Enforcement and Observance called attention to the
inordinate number of offenders Imprisoned for failure to pay fines. In five
Institutions studied, 65 per cent of the prisoners were serving terms of
thirty days or less, and 95 per cent terms of one year or less; a great many
of these were confined for nonpayment of fines." "It Is estimated that fines
constitute 75% of all sentences In the United States." Id. § 11, at 240.
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cause of inability to pay fines. 55 Applying this, the Frazier
rationale would alleviate many problems associated with generally overcrowded jails. Third, imprisonment of indigents for
failure to pay a fine is an economic burden on the state. The
estimated cost of maintaining a prisoner in jail is $6 per day"
or approximately $2,000 a year for an adult offender.57 In California alone, an average of $16,621,000 is spent each year to
support the indigent families of persons in jail. 8 It has been
noted that the disadvantages of an installment plan are outweighed by the decreased costs of prison maintenance and welfare payments. 59 Finally, no adequate plans for rehabilitation
are implemented in the city and county jails because the indigent
is there for a relatively short time.6° Even if the defendant will
be in jail for a considerable period, rehabilitative facilities and
personnel are generally lacking in these jails.
In addition to the above policy considerations, Frazier is
further supported by the decision of the United States Supreme
1
Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin."
This case held that an indigent
has a right to counsel if there is any possibility that he will be
subjected to a jail term of any length. Under this holding, an
indigent charged with an offense which imposes an alternative
sentence of fine or imprisonment would have a constitutional
right to demand that he be represented by court appointed
counsel. This would place an impractical and time-consuming
burden on the legal profession. Under Frazier,the indigent would
55. Id. § 16, at 253.
56. Id. n.154. See also State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 603 n.4, 483 P.2d
191, 193 n.4 (1971): "The daily per capita cost for each inmate at Oahu
State Prison for the year 1969-70 was $19.86 (a figure reported by the
Hawaii State Government, Department of Social Services, Corrections Division and computed from the Budget for Corrections Division, Fiscal Year
1969-70)."
57. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 15 (1967): "The Commission's nationwide survey of correctional operations revealed that the average cost of
probation supervision for an adult felony offender is $200 per year, while
the average yearly cost of imprisoning such an offender is almost $2,000."
58. Note, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 166, 167 n.15 (1971), citing the CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROGRESS REPORT: DETERRENT EFFECT

(1968).
59. Note, 50 N. CAR. L. REv. 136 (1971), and Comment, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
1013, 1022 (1953).
60. The defendant with adequate financial means escapes incarceration,
even though he has committed the identical offense as the indigent, who is
waiting out his fine in a jail room.
61. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 39
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not be entitled to a lawyer as there is no possibility of imprisonment for non-payment of the fine.
Of even greater relevance to the Frazier case is the concurring opinion in Argersinger of Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell discussed the "serious problems
of fairness" under the discretionary alternative sentence as
applied to indigents:
"The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary alternative of 'jail or fine') presents serious problems of fairness-both to indigents and nonindigents and to
the administration of justice. Cf. Tate v. Short. [Citations
omitted.] No adequate resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found. The rule adopted by the
Court today, depriving the lower courts of all discretion in
such cases unless counsel is available and is appointed, could
aggravate the problem." 2
Continuing, Powell discussed the equal protection ramifications
of Argersinger under the alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment. He stated that a judge who has determined in advance
that there will be no imprisonment in order to avoid the constitutional requirement of appointing a lawyer, has precluded
the imposition of any meaningful sentence on the indigent. The
convicted indigent may not be sent to jail because he was not
represented by counsel and fine will not serve as adequate
punishment since the indigent is without funds to pay. Consequently, there would be little to deter an indigent from subsequent similar offenses. Fraziernot only alleviates Argersinger's
requirement of appointing a lawyer in this situation, but likewise suggests that installment methods be introduced to insure
that an indigent will be adequately punished through gradual
payments on his fine.
Frazier's Impact in Louisiana
Assuming that the Supreme Court does accept the reasoning
in Frazier,new legislation will be necessary because, at present,
the federal government 8 and most states have statutes which
62. Id. at 2021 n.17.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1970): "In all criminal cases in which judgment
or sentence is rendered, imposing the payment of a fine or penalty, whether
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require imprisonment for non-payment of fines.
provision reads:

4

Louisiana's

"If a sentence imposed includes a fine or costs, the sentence
shall provide that in default of payment thereof the defendant shall be imprisoned for a specified period not to exceed
one year; provided that where the maximum prison sentence which may be imposed as a penalty for a misdemeanor
is six months or less, the total period of imprisonment upon
conviction of the offense, including imprisonment for default
in payment of a fine or costs, shall not exceed six months
for that offense."0 5
This procedure, which was introduced into the law over 100
years ago, 6 is now patently unconstitutional under Frazier.
A growing number of states have initiated procedures allowing indigents to pay fines in installments.6 7 A comparable system would be beneficial to Louisiana since it has no installment
plan for the payment of fines by indigents.6 8 Until such legislation is passed, the judges in the Fifth Circuit must improvise
some sort of temporary plan that does not destroy the spirit of
the Frazier decision.
As an example, in Baton Rouge district courts, the judge
will usually delay the imposition of sentence, i.e., instruct the
indigent to return in two weeks, and require the convicted
indigent to be present on that day with the amount of the fine. 9
alone or with any other kind of punishment, such judgment, so far as the
fine or penalty is concerned, may be enforced by execution against the
property of the defendant in like manner as judgments in civil cases. Where
the judgment directs imprisonment until the fine or penalty imposed is paid,
the issue of execution on the judgment shall not discharge the defendant
from imprisonment until the amount of the judgment is paid."
64. Bee note 2 supra. For a list of these statutes which were still in
effect in 47 states in 1971, see 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 166, 173 nn.54 & 55 (1971).
65. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 884. (Emphasis added.)

66. LA. CODE CEim. P. art. 884, comment (a).
67. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2901
(1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 52, § 18 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279,
§ 1A (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1953); PA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 953, 956
(1964); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.82.030 (Supp. 1972); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
57.04 (Supp. 1972).
68. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4(a)(2) (1971), for an example of new
legislation in this area.
69. Interview with Mr. Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., who at the time of the
interview was an assistant District Attorney in East Baton Rouge Parish
and is presently serving as a faculty member at L.S.U. Law School.

1973]

COMMENTS

This gives the indigent a short amount of time to secure the
required money and likewise postpones immediately sending him
to jail.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the validity of Frazier rests in its application of the compelling state interest test to the question of
the incarceration of indigents under the alternative sentence.
Since Griffin v. Illinois,70 there has been a growing concern to
protect the rights of the poor in the administration of criminal
justice. Also, the Supreme Court's recent questioning of the
imprisonment of indigents, as indicated by Williams, Morris, and
Tate, reveals that the Court will not hesitate to consider similar
problems. It appears that the traditional "30 dollars or 30 days"
fine, as applied to indigents, will be struck down by the Supreme
Court when it is confronted with a factual situation paralleling
Frazier.
Gerald E. Songy
BROADENED COVERAGE UNDER THE LHWCA
In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.' In addition to raising benefits2 and
making administrative changes,3 this recent legislation wrought
considerable changes in the substantive maritime law of the
United States. The provision dealing with third party liability
was amended to restrict an injured employee's action against
the shipowner to one based upon negligence, effectively denying
the "warranty of seaworthiness" to longshoremen. 4 Also eliminated was the "warranty of workmanlike service," which had
been read into maritime contracts to allow the shipowner to
70. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970), as amended by Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576 (Oct.
27, 1972), 86 Stat. 1251 [hereinafter cited as LHWCA 1972; reference to the
former Act will be made to the 1970 edition of the United States Code].
2. LHWCA 1972 §§ 5, 10.
3. E.g., the new legislation establishes a Benefits Review Board. LHWCA
1972 § 15.
4. LHWCA 1972 § 18. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946),
the Supreme Court had extended this no-fault tort remedy to those who
did work supposedly done by the members of the crew. For an analysis of
the harbor worker's unseaworthiness remedy, see George, Ship's Liability
to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness--Sieracki through Usner, 3
J. MAR. & COMM. 45 (1971).

